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Abstract –The TCP SYN DDoS attack and defense prevention 
mechanisms is studied. Each prevention mechanism has some 
exclusive pros and cons over the others. In this paper, we have 
compared various defence mechanisms for preventing 
potential TCP SYN DDoS attacks. Router based TCP 
Intercept is found to provide the best defense while Anti 
DDoS Guardian gave the worst defese. 
 
Index Terms –DDoS, TCP SYN Flood attack, DDoS defenses 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
   Internet usage is mounting at an exponential rate as 
organizations, governments and citizens continue to upsurge 
their reliance on this technology. Unfortunately with an 
increase in number of host, count of attacks on Internet has 
also increased incredibly fast.  DDoS (Distributed Denial of 
Service Attack) is one of the most common and major threat 
to the Internet in which the goal of the attacker is to consume 
computer resources of the victim, usually by sending a high 
volume of seemingly legitimate traffic requesting some 
services from the victim. With DDoS Attack, the attacker uses 
spoofed IP address so it can’t be traced back and get caught.  
The attacker can also use other computers as Zombies to 
attack the victim. 
Same Types of DDoS attacks are TCP SYN Flood, Smurf 
attack and IPV6 RA (Router advertisement) attack, and UDP 
Attack. The Smurf Attack is an attack in which numerous 
ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol)  packets with the 
envisioned victim's spoofed source IP are broadcast to a 
computer network using an IP Broadcast address. This causes 
all hosts on the network to reply to the ICMP request, causing 
significant traffic to the victim's computer. In an IPv6 RA 
attack, the attacker floods the network with a large number of 
rough IPv6 RA packets, from different sources. These 
packages usually look like genuine packets from the router but 
they contain fake information. In UDP Attack, The attacker 
can send a large number of UDP packets to random ports on a 
remote host. 
  A TCP SYN flood is a form of denial of service attack in 
which an attacker sends many SYN requests to a target's 
system in an attempt to consume sufficient server resources 
and network bandwidth to make the system impassive to 
legitimate traffic [1]. TCP SYN flood attack exploits the 
generic design of the TCP protocol. Any TCP based 
application it is required to complete the TCP 3 way 
handshake, before the data transfer.  TCP SYN Flood attack is 
investigated in this paper. TCP SYN Flooding has remained 
one of the most destructive attack since September 1996; 
numerous sites on the internet have been effected by a TCP 
SYN Flood denial of service attack, prevalently termed SYN 
Flooding [2].  
    The TCP 3 way handshake is a functionality used by TCP 
clients and servers for synchronizing and establishing 
connectivity before the actual data transfer. There are three 
stages of TCP 3 way handshake. TCP client initiates a 
connection request to TCP server with the SYN bit set in the 
flags in the TCP header. The TCP server on receipt of the TCP 
SYN segment responds with a TCP segment with TCP SYN 
and Ack bit set in the flags. The TCP client on receipt of the 
above TCP segment responds with a TCP segment with the 
ACK bit set in the flags.  
In a TCP SYN flood attack, the attacker exploits this 
behavior of the TCP protocol. The attacker crafts a TCP 
segment with the SYN bit set and sends it to the 
corresponding server. The server on receipt of the same would 
respond with a TCP segment with the SYN and Ack bit set. 
The corresponding state of the TCP connection in the TCP 
state table of the server would now progress to the SYN-
RECEIVED state. The server would now be waiting for the 
receipt of the TCP segment with the ACK bit set, for 
completing the TCP 3 way handshake and progress to the 
ESTABLISHED state. This is also referred to as TCP Half 
open state or embryonic connection, which refers to as a TCP 
connection which is in the progress of being established. In 
TCP SYN flood attack, the goal of the attacker is to fill up the 
TCP half open states, which are allowed for the system. When 
the maximum numbers of half open states are filled up in 
memory, the connection requests from legitimate users are 
dropped and the server run out of resources resulting crashing, 
creating a Denial of Service for the application for valid users. 
[3]. 
    In 2011, Subramani [4] did a test bed experiment on 
Distributed Denial of service attack using TCP SYN Attack, 
UDP Attack and ping of death attack. The network set up 
consisted of a router, connected to two switches with a 
legitimate computer, a victim, and attacker PC.  They used 
Hyenane packet generator to test the impact of defense against 
the attack. Two defenses used were Rate Limiting and 
ACL(Access Control List).  They measured RTT (Round Trip 
Time) delay and the results showed that without the attack the 
average RTT was 0.834 seconds and during the attack it went 
up to 8.782 seconds. With rate limiting the average RTT was 
6.985 seconds and with ACL it was 1.093 seconds. They also 
measured the network traffic rate. During the attack it was 
3216.389 kbps and without attack it was 241 Kbps. With ACL 
defense, it was 497kbps and with rate limiting it was 812 kbps. 
The results suggested that ACL is better defense than the rate 
limiting. 
   In 2012 Kaur et al [5], proposed a test bed experiment on 
TCP and UDP DDoS flood attacks. The test bed consisted of 
three computers connected to one router. One of the 
computers acts as a legitimate user, one as an attacker, and 
third computer as a victim which is a FTP server. The purpose 
of this study was to show the impact on the throughput during 
UDP and TCP attack. The results show there was a large 
increase in the throughput because there was larger request 
traffic than the legitimate users sent. In term of TCP flood 
attacks, before the attack the legitimate user throughput was 
around 75 Kbps and during the attack it was raised to double 
its amount reaching to 170 kbps.  
There has been little work done up till now on defenses 
such as ACL and Rate limiting with apache server. There was 
also no work on the latest version of webserver, Internet 
Information Services 8 (IIS8). The motivation behind this 
paper is therefore to focuses on comparing the latest defense 
techniques against TCP SYN attack and establishes which 
defense is the best. Also this paper shows if the new IIS8 
security is strong enough to stand against such an attack.  
    The organization of this paper is as follow. In next section 
the network set up is discussed. Section three covers 
information regarding the data generation and traffic 
measurement tool. Section four covers the identified defenses’ 
mechanism which will be used in this paper. Section five will 
cover the analysis of the result and the last section includes 
conclusion, future work and acknowledgments followed by 
the references.  
 
II. NETWORK SETUP 
   Network set up is shown in Figure 1. The test-bed was 
designated to simulate a real live implementation of TCP 
DDoS Attack. There are three types of machine in the test-bed. 
One computer will act as victim, second as monitoring and 
testing computer, and third is the two computers that initiate 
attacks. According to [7] in DDoS, multiple computers take 
part to flood a device with requests. In order to fulfill this, two 
attackers machine was used. Network set-up was consistent 
with similar research done in the past including the research in 
[6]. The victim machine has Microsoft Windows 2012 Server 
installed with web server IIS8 (Internet Information Services 8) 
application installed on it, which is the lasted version of 
Microsoft server. The machine where the attacker performs its 
attack has Linux Backtrack R3 installed on it that was a 
requirement of the software used for the attacks. Many papers 
with DDoS test-bed have used Linux system to attack as it 
consists of an exclusive tool to generate packets.  
The Monitoring PC holds Windows 7 is where the monitoring 
tools are installed to perform network testing analysis. This 
machine will also act as a legitimate user. 
 
 
Figure 1: Test-bed For TCP SYN Flood 
 
The computers benchmark comprised of an Intel® Core™ 
5 Duo 3.40 GHz processor with 8.00 GB RAM for the 
efficient processing of operating system, Switch cisco 2950  
and Router 2811 was chosen as the appropriate connection 
between the nodes. The router 2811 was used to have a spread 
network as well as it includes facilities to monitor the traffic in 
the network. The router in addition will be used for defensive 
purposes against the attacks. The Rip protocol was used in the 
router to initiate the connection. The proposed network test-
bed was setup through a direct connection via standard 
category 5e cabling among the machines.   
 
III. Data Generation and Traffic Measurement Tool 
    The last version of Hping3 [8] was chosen as an attacker 
traffic generator. Hping3 is considered as a real life 
penetration tool. Another packet generator used was Web 
stress tools [9]. This tools was used to send the legitimate 
traffic over the network and this was installed in the 
monitoring or user PC. For measuring the traffic, RTT was 
measured with an open source tool Tcping [10] and was used 
in the monitoring or user PC. Netflow analyzer, is another tool 
owned by cisco to monitor the traffic rate bandwidth in the 
network. Wirshark [11] was the primary tool used to capture 
the packet sent over the network. It was installed on the victim 
machine to capture incoming packets. These tools were used 
in many similar researches [12]. 
 
IV. DEFENSE MECHANISM 
   According to [13], all the efficient defenses for countering 
SYN flooding attacks can be approximately categorized into 
four: firewall-based, server-based, agent-based and router-
based. The firewall based will act on behalf of the services the 
packet needs to be inspected before it goes to the desired 
server. Server based mechanism  is where server monitor 
keeps the table of incomplete queued connections and so the 
server removes the need to watch for half-open connections. 
Examples are Sync cache [14] and SYN cookies [15]. Agent-
based [16] is software developed for mitigating the impact of 
SYN flooding attacks. This software will continuously 
monitoring the TCP three-way handshake messages before the 
server reply. Router-based distributed packet filtering (DPF) 
mechanism [17] exploits routing information to determine if a 
packet arriving at the router is valid with respect to its 
inscribed source/destination addresses.   
    In our experiments, we have chosen three types of 
categorized defense, the first one is router based defense 
which consist of a new technique RPF (Reverse Path 
Forwarding), TCP Intercept  [18], ACL (Access list) and Rate 
Limiting Defense. The other defense is Firewall based which 
include TMG (Threat Management Gateway) Proxy [19]. For 
agent-based we have chosen new software known as Anti 
DDoS Guardian [20]. The following explain the defenses in 
more detail. 
i. The TCP Intercept [18] feature on the Cisco firewall 
was used for the first defense. There are two modes 
for TCP intercept feature. The intercept mode, as the 
name suggests, intercepts TCP connections which are 
incoming to the target system. The router on receipt of 
the connection would respond, impersonating the 
server to the client. Only on successful completion of 
the TCP three way handshake, the server is allowed 
the actual connection. In our experiment, we have 
implement TCP intercept mode in router by using the 
command line (a script). This feature should eliminate 
malicious traffic, both spoofed IP address and that 
comes from TCP SYN Attack. 
ii. Rate Limiting [19] is the second defense evaluated. It 
places a cap or sets up a threshold limit of traffic that 
sever would be able to withstand. The best feature of 
this technique is that the network administrator is 
allowed to decide how much traffic to be let inside the 
network Cisco Router. In our experiment we have 
Limit traffic by choosing the number of bytes required 
to request the webpage. 
iii. The third defense was using ACL [19] known as IP 
addresses ingress filtering. The most commonly 
spoofed IP addresses are private IP addresses and 
other types of shared/special IP addresses. This 
technique will block any private IP address from 
entering the local network because the private IP 
address should not get inside the local network. In our 
experiment, these are the range of IP address that is 
been blocked from coming into the network: 
10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 
224.0.0.0/3, 169.254.0.0/16. This has been 
implemented in router by using ACL command line. 
However, since we are working on a test-bed, only the 
legitimate IP addresses are allowed for performance. 
If traffic comes from outside with one of these 
network addresses, it must be considered fraudulent 
traffic. 
iv. Another defense is RPF [19 ] which stand for Reverse 
Path Forwarding. This technique works much like part 
of an anti-spam solution. It takes the source IP address 
of a packet received from the Internet and looks up to 
see if the router has a route in its routing table to reply 
to that packet. If there's no route in the routing table 
for a response to return to the source IP, then it is 
likely that it is a spoofed packet, and the router drops 
the packet. In our experiment, we applied the defense 
on a router by using command line and the results 
show that this defense eliminated the spoofed IP 
Address.   
v. Another defense studied was Microsoft Forefront 
Threat Management Gateway [19] which is proxy 
server. TMG has parameters that determine traffic 
management coming from clients and specific port 
listens to web request and handles authentication. 
TMG Proxy has the options of stopping the flood 
denial of service attack for TCP, UDP and ICMP 
Packets. These options control TCP connection which 
includes TCP concurrent connections per IP Address 
option, TCP half-open connections option, maximum 
TCP connect requests per minute per IP address 
option, HTTP requests per minute per IP address 
option. In our experiment we have added the proxy 
server between the switch and router so when the 
request comes it should pass the proxy server first 
before going to the server straight away. 
vi. We have also used agent defense with software Anti 
DDoS Guardian [20]. This firewall software was 
mainly powered to prevent several of DDoS Attacks 
like UDP, ICMP, and TCP Attacks. The ability of this 
software is to control TCP connection which includes 
maximum number of TCP connection per second, 
maximum number of TCP connection for IP address, 
half open connection allowed, and the maximum 
number of concurrent client IP addresses.  In our 
experiment, we have installed the software agent in 
victim and we left the TCP connection options as 
default due to recommendation by the vendor.  
 
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In our results, three major metrics were measured the first is 
the average RTT which is the time taken for packet to reach its 
destination and return back to source. In RTT we can observe 
the delay between the request and response time. RTT is an 
important metrics for establishing TCP Connection [24]. The 
other metric is CPU utilization of the victim. Other researches 
show this is important as it can crash the system [25]. But we 
wanted to see how much CPU utilization was affected in a 
modern web server which we implemented (IIS8). The last 
measurement was the bandwidth. As mentioned before the 
flood attack affects the network by consuming the bandwidth. 
We then compare the defenses based on these parameters.  
Traffic was generated for 5 minutes (one run) and RTT, 
CPU utilization, and bandwidth was measured using the 
monitoring software explained earlier. The runs was continued 
for over 20runs and the results averaged and standard 
deviation was measured.  Runs continued until standard 
deviation was 0.05% of the average results. 
The experiment started  by using The Web stress tool to 
send legitimate packets from 5 users with a delay of 5 seconds 
between each users and then launching both attackers and 
defenses to see the impact. We used Wireshark to capture the 
incoming packet and allocate the number of packets before 
and after the attack for each run (5 minutes).  It was found that 
the legitimate user send only 8 packets per second and has 
generated traffic 32,925 Bytes while accessing the web page. 
The attacker flooded the network with almost 25000 packets 
per second and has generated   traffic 128581552 Bytes. 
 
Average RTT Results 
 
Table 1 shows that for legitimate users the average RTT was 
1.92ms before the attack, while, during the TCP SYN Attack 
the average RTT was around 5252.52ms. This happened due 
to thousands of packet jamming the network which resulted in 
longer delays than usual.  
 
 
Table 1:  Average RTT before attack, during attack, and various 
defenses  
 
It was noted that TCP Intercept was the most effective defense 
among the other defenses implemented, as it resulted in the 
average RTT to be 3.21 ms. This is because TCP Intercept 
eliminated malicious SYN attack traffic spoofed from 
reaching the server. Rate limiting resulted in the highest RTT. 
This happened, as mentioned earlier, rate limiting does not 
block the malicious traffic, it only limits the traffic to the 
threshold. ACL  was the second worst defense with RTT of 
3098.65 ms. Both anti DDoS and TMG Proxy have RTT 
2553.71 ms and 2803.34 ms respectively. The RTT of both 
anti DDoS and TMG Proxy gave high RTT, because they only 
drop the malicious when it comes but did not actually stopped 
the flooding. RPF defense almost halved RTT during attack 
(from 5252ms to 2553ms). It only stopped the spoofed IP 
address traffic not the attacker with a valid IP that can come 
from Zombies. 
 
CPU Utilization in the Target system  
 
TCP SYN Attack affect the CPU untilisation of the target 
system because the web server needs to proccess the requests 
and queue them  as there are many requests per second. As 
mentioned earlier, other research shows TCP SYN attack on 
some webservers can result in crashing of the system due to 
high CPU utlisation.  
 
Table 2: CPU Utilization before attack, during attack, and various 
defenses  
 
As we can see from Table 2, the CPU Utilisation percentage 
was 1 % before attack but it jumped up to 10 % during TCP 
SYN Attack. It was very surprising to see that IIS8 was able to 
hold up against the attack. In terms of defence, we discovered 
that TCP Intercept had completely eliminated the maclious 
traffic from passing the router and going to the webserver. 
This is quite similar to TMG Proxy in which  it has protected 
the server from getting damaged from TCP SYN Attack. 
However, we learned that during the attack the proxy server’s 
CPU itself went up to 60%. Both rate limiting and ACL have 
CPU utilisation of 9% because rate limiting allows passing the 
packets and ACL eliminates the maclious packets but still 
some packets do manage to pass through. RPF resulsts in 7% 
of the target system CPU. The highest CPU utilisation 
percentage was when Anti DDOS Guardian was used which 
reslusted in 50% because it was installed in the viticm 
machien.  
 
Average Network Bandwidth  
 
The more traffic there is the more the bandwidth will be 
consumed. 
 
Scenario Traffic Rate (Kbps) 
During TCP SYN Attack 776.51 
Without an attack 1.342 
With TCP Intercept 1.462 
With Rate Limiting 424.07 
With Access List 421.65 
With Reverse Path Forwarding  388.26 
Anti DDOS Guardian 630.30 
Forefront TMG Proxy 2010 610.16 
Table 3: Average Traffic Rate before attack, during attack, and 
various defenses. 
It can be noted from Table 3 that the traffic rate bandwidth 
without the attack is 1.342Kbps but during the attack it has 
significantly increased to 776.51Kbps which results in the 
legitimate user struggling to access the webserver. It can be 
observed that there is not much significant difference between 
TCP Intercept traffic rate average bandwidth and the 
Scenario Average RTT(ms) 
Without an attack  1.92 ms   
During the  attack 5252.52 ms 
With TCP Intercept 3.21 ms 
With Rate Limiting 3749.68 ms 
With Access List 3098.65 ms 
With Reverse Path Forwarding 2728.26 ms 
Anti DDOS Guardian 2553.71 ms 
Forefront TMG Proxy 2010 2803.34 ms 
Scenario Utilization 
During TCP SYN Attack 10 % 
Without an attack 1 % 
With TCP Intercept 1 % 
With Rate Limiting 9 % 
With Access List 9 % 
With Reverse Path Forwarding 7 % 
Anti DDOS Guardian 50 % 
Forefront TMG Proxy 2010 1 % 
legitimate traffic bandwidth as the defenses have dropped the 
connection before it enters the network which results in 1.462 
Kbps traffic rate. The proxy server is another defense which 
eliminates malicious traffic resulting in network traffic rate of 
610.16Kbps. This is due to proxy server eliminating the 
packets from reaching the server only. However it doesn’t 
actually drop the traffic from getting into the network. This is 
also the case for Anti DDOS Guardian which results in similar 
bandwidth as the proxy server. It just eliminates traffic within 
the victim machine but does let some packets pass through. 
ACL and Reverse Path Forwarding dropped the traffic to 
421.65Kbps and 388.26Kbps respectively. Rate Limiting has 
the traffic rate bandwidth of 424.07Kbps as it allowed the 
traffic but with some threshold limit. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
During our experiments we established that the most 
destructive side of the SYN attack was to consume the 
bandwidth of the network which made legitimate users take 
longer time to access the destination system. Looking into the 
three mercies we have measured we could define the best and 
the worst defense. TCP Intercept is the best option to protect 
from network consumption and appliances as it acts on behalf 
of the server. However the average delay still increased from 
1.92ms (without attack) to 3.21 ms (with defesene). TCP 
intercept reduced the Victim CPU Utilization to 1% and traffic 
bandwidth rate only increased a bit from 1.342 (without 
attack) to 1.462 kbps (with defense).   The worst defense 
depends on the metrics studied. In terms of RTT, Rate 
Limiting cannot be an ideal solution as it still permits 
controlled traffic with high RTT of 3749.68 ms. For CPU 
utilisation,  Rate limiting and ACL only made the Utilization 
of Victim CPU to 9%. However Anti DDoS Guardian has   
increased almost 50% the CPU.. Surprisingly in bandwith 
evaluation, Anti DDoS Guardian was the worst. It increased 
the traffic rate from 1.342 Kbps (without attack) to 630.30 
Kbps (with defesene). Because it did not stop the attack but 
drop the traffic coming into the victim’s computer. So we 
conclude that in router based filtering, TCP intercept is the 
best defense and the worst is the Rate Limiting. Among all the 
defenses category  Anti DDoS Guardian is the worst.  
 
VII. FUTURE WORKS 
Since IPv4 is disappearing and is getting substituted by IPv6, 
the future work must emphasis on stopping DDoS in IPv6. 
Although additional headers and options for improved security 
in IPv6, it is still susceptible to numerous Denial of Service 
attacks. Thus further research effort should be emphasized on 
IPv6 security and suitable mitigation techniques should be 
introduced for prevailing vulnerabilities. 
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